Replace API keys and IP whitelists with mutual identity - zero credential leakage, zero rotation overhead.
B2B integrations today run on API keys, at best case with an additional IP allow-list. Both assume a static, manageable perimeter. Neither scales with autonomous systems, and the dynamic nature of the cloud. Credential leakage is a clear and present risk along with vulnerability exposre and supply chain vector risk.
With Identity Plus, each client manages and rotates their own X.509 identity certificates - independently, without coordination with your team. The service maps the relationship once and authenticates at every connection. No shared secrets. No rotation schedules. No secrets managers. Highest security posture, lowest operational overhead.
The same gateway your teams use for internal service access is your external B2B integration layer without a single additional configuration. Open an internal deployment to the internet - it becomes a B2B integration. The architecture does not change.
The gateway deployed here is the same one securing your internal microservices. Move the boundary - the architecture stays the same.
With Identity Plus
High Security, frictionless experience.
The
With mTLS Gateway
Deploy mTLS Gateway in front of any HTTP or TCP service for granular, dynamic access
Works for HTTP applications, REST APIs, and raw TCP connections alike - including database admin consoles and any service that speaks TCP.
Gate any service - HTTP or TCP - without touching a line of code.
The systems most in need of security hardening are often the least accessible to change. Legacy codebases, vendor-managed applications, long-running infrastructure - these sit exposed not by design but by circumstance. The upgrade path to modern authentication does not exist when you cannot modify the application.
mTLS Gateway sits in front of the service, not inside it. It enforces mutual authentication at the connection layer - before any request reaches the application. The application never knows the gateway is there. The attacker never reaches the application.
This pattern works identically for a decades-old internal admin console and an internet-facing database. The Postgres blog post shows exactly this in production - a TCP service, no code changes, full mTLS perimeter enforcement.
The same gateway securing legacy services is your microservices perimeter and your B2B integration layer. One deployment, every boundary.
Secure authentication for RPA and AI agents - identical to the model humans use, for the same infrastructure.
RPA bots and autonomous agents today authenticate with service credentials - username and password at best, API keys in practice. Two-factor authentication is structurally impossible for machines. The result: your automated workforce operates on the least secure credentials in your environment, with no path to improvement under the existing model.
mTLS Perimeter enables mutual TLS client certificate authentication for machines - the same authentication model humans use in the browser, applied to the same infrastructure. Either as a direct replacement for service credentials, or as an mTLS underlay beneath existing username and password - preserving local role systems while upgrading the authentication layer transparently.
Each autonomous worker carries one unique cryptographic identity. Actions are attributable. Delegation chains are explicit. The owner is always traceable, no matter how deep the automation runs. This is the identity foundation for the agentic era - not a finished product for every deployment, but the architectural primitive on which accountable autonomous systems are built.
The same identity infrastructure your engineers carry is extended to the machines working alongside them. One identity model - human and machine unified.
The
MFA exists for humans. Machines have no face, no device binding, no liveness to verify. The autonomous workforce operates on credentials that predate the assumption of autonomy. Every bot is a shared secret waiting to leak - and there is no 2FA to catch it.
What is worse, is that in order to allow even 1 bot to access a system, 2FA cannot be mandatory, meaning the overall security and policy posture of the entire system is degraded to 1FA.
mTLS The machine equivalent MFA
X.509 client certificates are something the machine has, but mutual TLS cements the dynamics of security unequivocally, as it also prevents connection from machines that don't have the right one. In the Identity Plus case, a cryptographically bound identity, self-rotating, owner-attributed. Not a credential. An identity. The authentication gap closes without changing the infrastructure it authenticates against.
Why
N services × M dependencies × R rotation points. The geometry is multiplicative. Vault and its equivalents attempt synchronous rotation across every integration point - but only where plugins exist. Full plugin coverage is a myth in practice. Rotation without full coverage is rotation in name only. The credential that wasn't rotated is the one that gets exploited.
Identity as a Code ( IDaaC )
Deploy mTLS Gateway in front of any HTTP or TCP service for granular, dynamic access
Each service worker is provisioned an identity at deploy and reprovisioned at redeploy. The identity exists for exactly as long as the instance exists - and then it is gone. Not rotated, not revoked, not managed out of existence. Gone, because the thing it represented is gone.
No rotation schedule (it's self-rotated by the instance), no secrets manager, no plugin dependency. Nobody knows the credential - not because it is protected, but because there is nothing to know. The identity lives only with the deployed instance. The attack surface for that credential is exactly one: the running instance, for the duration of its life.
Implemented as direct SDK integration or as mTLS underlay beneath existing credentials - the same pattern as the Postgres legacy uplift, applied at microservices scale. The downstream service sees nothing different. The credential model is transformed into an identity model without the service knowing anything changed. C=1×N. The geometry collapses.
Collapse credential complexity at the architecture level - no secrets managers, no rotation schedules.
Microservices credential sharing is the unsolved problem at scale. Every service-to-service interaction is a credential dependency. Every credential dependency is a rotation requirement. Secrets managers attempt to manage this geometry - but the geometry is multiplicative by design, and management is not elimination.
Identity Plus replaces the credential substrate with self-managed cryptographic identity. Each service worker has one identity, valid across all its service relationships. Rotation is autonomous and continuous. No coordination, no schedules, no plugins required.
Deploy as direct SDK integration for new services or as mTLS underlay for existing ones - preserving local role systems while upgrading the authentication layer. The pattern is the same as the Postgres legacy uplift, applied internally at any scale.
Open your internal microservices deployment to external partners - it becomes a B2B integration without modification. The boundary moves. The architecture stays.
mTLS-native SSO - AD compatible, OIDC/OAuth2 integrated, human and machine on one identity model.
Corporate Zero Trust today means layering tools - VPN, MFA, SSO, PAM - each solving a slice of the problem, none solving the authentication primitive. The result is complexity that compounds with every new user, contractor, and autonomous system added to the environment.
Identity Plus provides mTLS-native corporate identity with Active Directory group and role alignment. OIDC/OAuth2 autoprovisioning means existing applications integrate without modification. Every user, device, contractor, and autonomous agent carries a cryptographic identity - one authentication model, the same infrastructure.
Zero trust for HTTP applications, TCP legacy admin consoles, database interfaces, third party contractors, and production infrastructure. One gateway, every boundary - including the boundaries traditional Zero Trust tools cannot reach because they do not speak TCP or cannot handle non-human actors.
The corporate identity your employees carry is the same model as your B2B partners, your autonomous agents, and your legacy services. The boundary between corporate and production, internal and external, human and machine - is a configuration, not an architecture.
What Zero Trust usually
Most Zero Trust implementations cover HTTP and browser-based access. They stop at TCP. Legacy admin consoles, database interfaces, internal tooling - these remain outside the perimeter.
Even when implemented perfectly into the corporate environment, contractors and autonomous agents fall outside the identity model entirely. This happens because existing identity infrastructures do not capture these varieties of actors under the same framework.
Zero Trust that reaches everything
mTLS operates at TCP/TLS - below HTTP, below application protocol. Any TCP service is gatable. Any actor - human, device, contractor, or autonomous agent - is identifiable. AD alignment maps to your existing organisational structure. OIDC bridges to your existing application estate. Nothing is left outside.
The self-governed, public nature of the Identity Plus identity infrastructure means that the platform does not treat internal and external identities differently. This results in a zero trust environment that does not end at the corporate perimeter.
One architecture. Every boundary.
The whole concept behind zero-trust is to avoid circumstances where trust is implicit. But what if trust is always explicit as part of the architecture?
Across every use case on this page, you encountered the same gateway, the same identity model, the same authentication primitive. That is not a coincidence - it is the architectural property that makes Identity Plus different from every other tool in this space.
Other solutions are boundary-specific. A B2B API security product. A Zero Trust network access tool. A secrets manager for microservices. Each solves one boundary, creates another integration point, and adds to the credential substrate.
Identity Plus has no concept of boundary. The gateway securing your internal microservices is the same gateway that gates your legacy TCP admin consoles, authenticates your B2B partners, and identifies your autonomous agents. Move the gateway - the boundary moves with it. The architecture, the identity model, and the operational overhead do not change.
This is not a feature. It is what identity infrastructure looks like when it is built from the protocol layer up - rather than assembled from tools that were each designed for a different era of the Internet.
Internal microservices - B2B integrations
Open your internal deployment to the internet. It becomes a B2B integration without modification. Same gateway, same identity model, different boundary.
Corporate access - Production perimeter
Put the gateway between corporate and production. Zero Trust access to infrastructure - HTTP and TCP, human and machine, employees and contractors.
Legacy TCP service - Supply chain security
Extend the same gateway to third parties. A legacy database admin console becomes a compliant, authenticated supply chain integration point.
Human identity - Machine identity
One identity model - the same infrastructure, the same authentication primitive. The actor changed. The architecture did not have to.
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